Does Peter Parker Have a Moral Responsibility to Be Spider-Man?

Science wiz Peter Parker gains superpowers from the bite of a radioactive spider. Soon after, he presents himself to the world as the amazing Spider-Man, New York City's friendly neighborhood superhero who helps the helpless, thwarts criminals, and in general tries to further the public good. Often, Peter wonders whether he should remain Spider-Man. The role taxes him significantly, hurting his studies and his personal life. Is Peter morally permitted to throw in his costume?

I believe that he is. Taking up the role of a superhero is a supererogatory act—an act that's good to do, but not wrong not to do. If we were consequentialists and thought that the rightness and wrongness of actions depends entirely on the good or bad outcomes produced, we would believe that Peter is morally obligated to be Spider-Man, at least on the assumption that being a superhero produces more overall good than being a good scientist, boyfriend, etc. As appealing as consequentialism might seem at first blush, it's riddled with problems. For example, given the track record of criminals escaping capture, it would no doubt promote the most overall good for Spider-Man to kill his most dangerous adversaries—Venom, Doc Ock, the Green Goblin—rather than allow them to continue their harmful criminal sprees again and again and again after escaping imprisonment. But most of us think that it would be wrong to kill the Green Goblin just because doing so would produce more good than capturing him and letting him live to fight another day on the likely chance he'll escape. To the extent that you share that view, you're going to start down the path that rejects consequentialism.

Walking down that path, I think that Peter is morally permitted to choose a career in science and a relationship with Mary Jane over a career as the wallcrawler. Most of us take seriously the importance of having the freedom to choose among various life pursuits. Given my argumentative inclinations, I might have made a great prosecutor and spent decades putting away guilty parties, perhaps some who otherwise would have walked and caused more harm. I chose education instead, as a professional philosopher. I like to think I'm doing good, but let's suppose it's not as much good as I would have done as a prosecutor. Am I doing something wrong by remaining a philosopher, then? It sure doesn't seem so. Just as we think there is moral importance to bringing about good, we also think there is moral value to having the choice as far as what good we want to bring about, and how much sacrifice we're willing to make in order to bring about that good.

There's tons more to say on this, of course, but that's a good start. Peter should be congratulated for being the amazing Spider-Man precisely because he's doing more than what moral duty demands; he's going beyond the call of duty.

Christopher Robichaud is an instructor in public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and a lecturer in philosophy at Tufts University.